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1) INTRODUCTION 
The issue at the crux of this legal writing is whether awards for exemplary damages may 
be awarded in actions for negligence. New Zealand courts have recently developed a trend 
indicating an extension of awarding exemplary damages for actions where there has been 
an absence of consciousness on the part of the wrongdoer. Traditionally because of the 
focus on the defendant's state of mind, exemplary damages have only been awarded in 
actions in intentional torts. In the New Zealand case of Taylor v Beere1 , Cooke J stated 
that malice was an essential ingredient in awarding exemplary damages. In Australia, the 
position is similar where Windeyer Jin Uren v John Faiifax & Sons Pty. Ltd. 2 required 
a "conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another's rights." Where the 
defendant has not turned his mind to the act in question or has turned his mind but 
disregards the consequences of his actions and therefore fails to reach the appropriate duty 
of care, are exemplary damages justified? If the defendants acted so recklessly that a 
dangerous situation is created but yet because they lack intent or malice, exemplary 
damages are not awarded. 
Case law in New Zealand has pointed towards a developing idea that exemplary damages 
may arise for actions not quite amounting to malice. Recently exemplary damages have 
been awarded in other tortious actions such as nuisance, conversion and conspiracy. 
Therefore the next step is to explore the possibilities to allow for an award of exemplary 
damages in action for negligence. 
'Taylor v Beere (1982] lNZLR 81. 
2 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons. Pty. Ltd. (1965-1966) 117 C.L.R. 118. 
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An analogy to help would be the recent Cave Creek situation. Would surviving victims3 be 
able to claim form the Department of Conservation for exemplary damages if it was 
established that DOC were grossly negligent in constructing the platform at Cave Creek? If 
the accident had taken place in other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Canada, 
Australia and the USA, exemplary damages would be awarded assuming the proper 
threshold of negligence was attained. Exactly how negligence is required is still a matter of 
debate in those jurisdictions. In the Cave Creek situation, exemplary damages may be seen 
as a source of remedies due to the possible inadequacies in the ARCIA 4 legislation5• This is 
similar to other cases such as work place accidents. 
While case law in New Zealand, as with Canada and Australia, has indicated that actions 
for negligence will no longer be seen as an automatic bar for exemplary damages it is 
important to analyse the policy issues that may arise if the role of exemplary damages was 
broadened in New Zealand. Those issues and the standard of negligence threshold 
required to award exemplary damages in negligence and other consequences will be 
examined further on. 
A) Exemplary Damages 
Rookes_v Bamarrf serves as the authority for exemplary damages in England. In that case 
Lord Devlin drew a distinction between exemplary damages and aggravated damages. The 
latter being to compensate the victim for aggravated injury to "the plaintiffs proper feelings 
3 Exemplary damages can only be claimed by the person who has suffered the damages 
because they are so personal in nature. Law Reform Act 1936 & Re Chasse [1989] lNZLR 
325. 
4 Accident, Rehabiliatation, Compensation and Insurance Act 1992. 
5 Since the 1992 Act, lump sum payments have been removed and the availability and 
quantum of compensation available has been reduced. 
6 Rookes v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129. 
2 
of dignity and pride"7 whilst exemplary damages were damages which were awarded to 
punish the defendant and vindicate the strength of the law. 
It may be gathered that unlike aggravated and compensatory damages, exemplary damages 
are of a punitive rather than a compensatory nature. As stated by Lord Devlin "[t]he object 
of exemplary damages is to punish and deter.8" There are a variety of words used to 
describe a situation where exemplary damages are awarded such as "wanton, reckless, 
willful conduct" or a "contumelious disregard for the plaintiffs rights" but often they are 
awarded to show the judge's disapproval of conduct which "was marked by 
vindictiveness, arrogance and complete disregard for the plaintiffs rights"
9
• Therefore it is 
important to remember that exemplary damages focuses on the wrongdoer's conduct and 
not what the plaintiff has suffered. 
Drawing back to the English decision of Rookes v Bamard
10
, Lord Devlin deemed an 
award of exemplary damages as an anomaly and restricted its award to three categories. 
1. Where there has been an oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by 
servants of the government 
2. Where "the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for 
himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff. 
3. And finally in cases expressly authorized by statues. 
These categories were later reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Cassel & Co. Ltd. V 
Broome1 1 • 
7 Above n.6. 
8 Above n.6. 
9 SM D Todd The Law of Torts in New 'Zealand (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1991) 
872. 
10 See n.6. 
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However these categories imposed by Lord Devlin have not been so widely accepted in 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions. In New Zealand, more importantly, the case of Taylor 
v Beere12 allowed for exemplary damages to be awarded in New Zealand and disregarded 
the categories laid down by Rookes v Barnard13 • 
B) Accident Compensation Scheme 
It is important in New Zealand to briefly take into account the ARCIA14 legislation 
alongside exemplary damages. This is because section 4 of the Act created a statutory bar 
whereby any common law proceedings arising directly or indirectly out of any personal 
injuries covered under the Act are barred in any court in New Zealand. In Donselaar v 
Donselaar15 , Cooke allowed exemplary damages to be claimed for personal injury on the 
basis that the ACC legislation had no punitive purpose. Therefore in "moulding damages to 
meet social needs" 16 , Cooke J asked for moderation in making these awards and identified 
and accepted the following considerations laid down by Lord Devlin in Rookes v 
Bamard17• 
I.That the plaintiff can not recover exemplary damages unless s/he is the victim of that 
punishable behaviour. 
2.That the power to award exemplary damages is a weapon that should be used with 
restraint and 
11 Cassel & Co. Ltd. V Broome [1972] A.C. 1027. 
12 The case was an action in defamation where the plaintiffs photograph had been used 
without her consent in a sex manual. The photograph had been used even though the 
plaintiff had objected. 
13 Here the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant's under the tort of intimidation. 
The defendants had threatened to withdraw their labour or get the corporation to fire the 
plaintiff unless the plaintiff joined their union. 
14 See n.4. 
15Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] lNZLR 97. 
16Above n.15, 107. 
17 See n.6. 
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3. That the parties' means are relevant in the assessment of the size of the award. 
2) CASE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
The issue in New Zealand as to whether exemplary damages may be awarded in areas of 
negligence has only ever risen in a theoretical and academic framework. The case law has 
come to addressing the issue has been the recent case of Akavi v Taylor-Preston18• The 
plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a scalper on the mutton chain. Due to a work 
accident, the plaintiff suffered severe head injuries and was permanently partially 
incapacitated. The case considered the point in law as it was a strike-out action at the High 
Court level. The two main issues in that case were: 
1. Whether exemplary damages may be awarded for an action in negligence and 
2. whether awarding exemplary damages in the civil courts when the defendant had 
already been criminally punished would constitute double punishment under s26(2) 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
The former issue is identical to that of this note and the law surrounding it in New Zealand 
was well presented by counsel for the plaintiff. His main submission was "that exemplary 
damages were governed not by the nature of the tort but by the conduct of the wrongdoer 
19 
." This would be consistent with the purpose of exemplary damages since its objective is 
to punish and deter. It would be wrong to focus on the adequacies of damages already 
awarded to the plaintiff but the main focus by the court should be on the circumstances 
surrounding the wrongdoer's actions. As is the trend in New Zealand, the defendant's 
actions had to be "a conscious wrongdoing" or with "intention" or with "malice". Whilst 
this is the traditional view of the exemplary damages, the courts have shown an increasing 
18Akavi v Taylor-Preston Ltd [1995] NZAR 33. 
19 Above n.18, 39. 
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flexibility in awarding exemplary damages in cases where the required consciousness or 
malice is not met 
A) Traditional Case Law 
Case law in New Zealand has only ever awarded exemplary damages in actions grounded 
in the intentional torts. In Donselaar v Donselaar0 , it was an action of assault brought by a 
John Donselaar against his brother, Andrew Donselaar. Andrew had struck John on the 
head although the trial judge found that John had been the principal irritant in the affair. 
Decided on the same day as Taylor v Beere 21 in the Court of Appeal, the case mainly 
deals with the availability of exemplary damages in the common law notwithstanding s5(1) 
of the ACC act 1982. The majority decided that the exemplary damages arose not out of the 
loss sustained by the plaintiff but from the "outrageous and high handed manner" in which 
the defendant had conducted himself. 
However the two main cases of Taylor v Beere 22 and Donselaar v Donselaar 
23 deal only 
with the availability of exemplary damages in the common law in New Zealand. No 
reference was made to the availability of exemplary damages in negligence as the cases 
were based on libel and assault respectively. Both being actions which would have easily 
contained the requisite malicious or conscious element If anything, the indication that there 
be a conscious or malicious requisite would indicate that exemplary damages were not 
available for negligence but it is important to take note of the judge's policy arguments for 
granting exemplary damages in New Zealand. 
20 See n.15. 
21 See n.1. 
22 Above n.21. 
23 See n.15. 
6 
Cooke J in Donselaar v Donselaar 24 said that because of the lack of compensation and 
aggravated damages in the common law to impose punishment due to ACC. "punitive 
damages would have to do some of the work originally done by the other heads of 
damages."25 It would seem that in "consciously moulding the law of damages to meet 
social needs"26 , an extension of exemplary damages to actions in negligence would seem to 
be perfectly in accordance with Cooke's reasoning. It indicates that New Zealand courts 
should be willing to develop the law of damages in New Zealand rather than allow it to 
remain stagnant as has been the case in England. 
Tay/,or v Beere27 is the leading case in New Zealand as it made exemplary damages 
available in New Zealand. It made no mention of excluding exemplary damages for actions 
in negligence. It followed the decision laid down by the Australian case of Uren v John 
Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. 28 in deciding that the categories for awarding exemplary damages 
as laid down by Rookes v Barnard 29 did not apply in New Zealand. Like Donse/,aar v 
Donselaar 30 , both cases refer basically to the availability of exemplary damages in New 
Zealand which the judges have managed to define as "high-handed" or "conscious 
disregard for the plaintiffs rights". It must be noted however that both cases signal the 
start of exemplary damages as "a new weapon in the legal armoury"31 of New Zealand 
courts. 
24 See n.15. 
25 See n.15, 107. 
26 Above n.25. 
TI See n.1. 
28 See n.2. 
29 See n.1. 
30 See n.15. 
31 See n.15, 107. 
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B) Recent Case Law 
Since then, claims for exemplary damages in New Zealand have flourished. The case of 
Green v Matheson 32 arose from the 1988 Cartwright report on the Cervical Cancer 
enquiry at the National Women's Hospital in Auckland. The plaintiff had been a patient of 
the defendant's research program and as a result contracted cancer of the cervix. The case 
affirmed Donselaar v Donselaar3 by stating that claims for exemplary damages were not 
barred by the ACC legislation. The Court of Appeal ruled that her claim for exemplary 
damages in negligence should be allowed to stand. This case presented the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal with a chance to limit the role of exemplary damages only to actions in 
intentional torts but instead the claim was allowed to stand. 
The case of Tucker v Bell 34 (another case of medical negligence) was again a claim for 
exemplary damages for an action in negligence. There Temm J noted the difficulty in that, 
on the facts, there was no reference "to any intention to harm, nor to wanton disregard of 
her right, nor to any high-handed conduct, nor to any of the other general allegations 
usually to be found in claims for exemplary damages. 35" However he also went on to state 
that "it may turn out that the plaintiff is able to establish that there has been such poor 
advice by the defendant that there has been bungling or incompetence of a kind so bad as to 
justify some measure of punitive relief. 36" 
Whilst the decision concerned an application to strike out, Temm J refused to strike out the 
application. He went on to note that whilst there was a possibility for exemplary damages 
on the facts here, any amount awarded would be far less than the claim.(100 000). 
32 Green v Matheson [1989) 3NZLR 564. 
33 See n.15. 
34 Tucker v Bell Unreported, 5 September 1991, High Court Auckland Registry CP 1909/90. 
35 Above n.34, 3. 
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These cases have indicated that the New Zealand courts have taken a broadening 
perspective to the area of exemplary damages. Since the late 1980s, there have been cases 
indicating that it is possible for exemplary damages to be awarded in negligence. 
In McKenzie v A-G37 , the plaintiff brought a claim for damages after having been 
negligently exposed to asbestos during his course of employment Cooke in obita said 
"while claims for damages from personal injury caused by negligence in breach 
of a duty of care relating to personal safety or a fiduciary duty or other duty so 
relating, or by assault or battery or rape, are barred if arising after 1 April 1974 ... 
The Act never bars, however, a claim for exemplary damages, although the effect 
of the Law Reform act 1936 is that the conduct must be towards a living 
claimant. This freedom to claim exemplary damages remains whether the 
conduct occurred before or after the inception of the accident compensation 
scheme. "38 
The claim for exemplary damages were allowed even though it was based on negligence. It 
may also be argued that in that context, it would imply that a claim in negligence would not 
prevent exemplary damages being awarded if a proper case was made out. Boustridge v 
A-G39 expanded more on the notion of the availability of exemplary damages in 
negligence. Here the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached his duty of care by 
causing the plaintiff to reasonably believe that he had been exposed to the HIV virus. The 
District Court judge stated that "a remedy of exemplary damages does not lie in relation to 
non-intentional torts or those of omission rather than commission."40 Blanchard J however 
stated that availability for exemplary damages in negligence was an open question and that 
36 Above n.35. 
37McKenzie v Attorney-General [1992] 2 NZLR 14. 
38 Above n.37, 15. 
39 Boustridge v Attorney-General Unreported, 29 September 1993, High Court Auckland 
Registry H.C. 54/93. 
40 Above n.39, 11. 
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it would be "very rare for exemplary damages to be awarded where a claim is made in 
negligence only. For this reason, it may be thought unlikely on the facts that the plaintiff 
would succeed in obtaining exemplary damages, but the theoretical possibility exists.',4 1 
C) Comment 
In conclusion, the case of Akavi v Taylor-Preston42 is the most recent case in New 
Zealand concerning the availability of exemplary damages in negligence. Master Thompson 
essentially summarized the position in New Zealand by holding that "reduced availability 
and quantum of ACC legislation may lead the courts to extend the concept of negligence to 
permit common law damages to be awarded.43" In this case it would be exemplary 
damages. 
It is important to remember that the case was only a strike-out application and based on 
case law, it would seem that the next step would possibly be to broaden the scope of 
exemplary damages, however I submit that before exemplary damages be extended to 
include actions in negligence, closer consideration be made as to its practical application 
and the policy implications that arise.44 
Whilst most of the cases in New Zealand indicate a trend to extend exemplary damages to 
negligence, no actual award has been made. Therefore while it is theoretically possible for 
exemplary damages to be awarded, and it would seem to be the right step forward, there 
are questions to be asked regarding it s practical application in the courts. The New 
Zealand courts have adopted the approach laid down by Cooke in Donselaar calling for 
exemplary damages to be moulded to meet social demands. Therefore in New Zealand, 
several points may be taken form current case law, that awarding exemplary damages in 
41 Above n.40. 
42 See n.18. 
43 Above n.42, 33. 
44 Allowing exemplary damages for negligence would seem to be contrary to the intentions 
of Donselaar and the ARCIA legislation. See chapter on Policy. 
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New Zealand is theoretically possible, the situations where they may be awarded are rare 
and exemplary damages should take on a more developed role in common law actions. 
Exactly how and in what circumstances they would be awarded will be analyzed later. 
Decisions from other commonwealth jurisdictions where exemplary damages have actually 
been awarded for negligence will hopefully help assess the practical application of 
exemplary damages in negligence. 
3) CASE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 
A) Exemplary Damages in Australia 
The two main commonwealth jurisdictions that will be examined are Australia and Canada. 
Our nearest neighbor has adopted a more liberal interpretation of the role of exemplary 
damages. The case of Uren v John Fai,fax & Co. Pty. Ltd. 45describes the type of 
behaviour which may lead to a general award of exemplary damages as a "conscious 
wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another's rights"46 • The High Court of Australia 
here chose not to follow the decision of Rookes v Bamard" 7 in restricting the award of 
exemplary damages the three categories laid down by the English case. On appeal to the 
Privy council, it had chosen not to change the decision of the High Court because based 
on policy, "such a matter should be fashioned by the judiciary in the country concerned, it 
being a matter of local opinion."48 
45See n.2 . 
46Above n.45, 129. 
47 See n.6. 
48 Australian Consolidated Press v Uren (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118. 
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B) Lamb v Cotogno 
The two most important cases in Australia are Lamb v Cotogno49 and Cowca v BP 
Australia Luf0• The former arose where the plaintiff having had an argument with the 
defendant, threw himself onto the bonnet of the defendant's car. The defendant drove off 
and then braked suddenly, throwing the plaintiff onto the ground causing him injury. The 
defendant then drove off leaving the plaintiff injured on the side of the road where he was 
later discovered. The main argument for the defendant was that there was a lack of intent, 
malice or reckless indifference by the defendant and therefore it was seen not to deserve an 
award of exemplary damages. The court adopted the test, which has also been widely 
accepted in New Zealand of whether there has been a "contumelious disregard of the 
plaintiffs rights." The trial judge had previously held that whilst there was nothing 
malicious in the defendant's actions, "callously abandoning him on the road made it 
appropriate for exemplary damages to be awarded."51 He was of the view that under the 
circumstances, exemplary damages were justified. The Supreme Court of New South 
Wales on appeal held that "whilst there can be no malice without intent, the intent or 
recklessness necessary to justify an award of exemplary damages may be found in 
contumelious behaviour which falls short of being malicious or not being aptly so 
described."52 Therefore it would seem that there is no need for a "conscious wrongdoing" 
or "intent" by the defendant but where the circumstances reflect contumelious behaviour, 
exemplary damages should be deemed necessary and justified. Whilst the case was not 
actually made in negligence but trespass tot the person, it is important since it calls for the 
courts to be willing to draw an inference of intent or recklessness from the circumstances 
surrounding the case. This indicated a departure from the strict notion that exemplary 
49Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R. 1. 
50 Caloca v BP Australia [1992] Australian Torts Reporter 61, 164. 
51 See n.49 , 6. 
52 Above n.51, 2. 
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damages could only be awarded with evidence of the wrongdoer's intention, Lamb v 
Cotogno 53 was a relaxation of the standard of intention required to determine the 
"contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs rights". 
C) Caloca v BP Australia 
The second case of Caloca v BP Australia54 is a more recent case and arose when the 
plaintiff brought an action against his employer for negligently exposing him to toxic and 
noxious fumes during the course of his employment. It stated that whilst this was the first 
time an Australian court had questioned the recoverability of exemplary damages, in 
principle, in a negligence action, the High Court in Lamb v Cotogno55 had affirmed 
exemplary damages for an action in trespass but the very same facts would have been 
admitted to prove a case in negligence. Nothing in that judgment indicated that exemplary 
damages would not have been recoverable had the claim been brought in negligence. 
Justice O'Bryan drew an important example which demonstrated the illogicality of the 
defendant's submission that exemplary damages were not available for actions based in 
negligence. 
"Assume that a bus owner flagrantly and wantonly ignored brake maintenance 
despite repeated warnings from his employees. At a point in time the brakes 
failed and a young child is maimed. Surely logic does not require that in those 
circumstances the plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages because the 
action was brought in negligence not trespass."56 
53 Above n.52 
54 See n.50. 
55 See n.49. 
56 See n.50, 168. 
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It would therefore seem ridiculous to refuse an award for exemplary damages because the 
claim for damages was grounded in negligence rather than in the intentional torts. 
Therefore this would seem to a procedural barrier to what should have been a substantive 
issue. The court thus held that firstly exemplary damages were permitted in an action for 
personal injuries caused by negligence and secondly, the recovery of exemplary damages 
was not, in principle, confined to 'intentional' torts. It was governed by the conduct of the 
wrongdoer and not the nature of the tort. Justice O'Bryan however made a note of caution 
in saying that such cases were rarer and unusual and went on to clarify the exact 
description of an award of exemplary damages in negligence by referring to Mayne and 
MacGregor on Damages57 "they can only apply where the conduct of the defendant merits 
punishment..or as it is sometimes put, where he acts in contumelious disregard of the 
plaintiffs rights."58 
D) Comment 
Case law in Australia has made several important points. First, that they have made clear 
that exemplary damages are indeed recoverable in actions based in negligence, secondly, 
that the lack of intent or malice may still make exemplary damages available where the 
circumstances justify it and finally, situations where exemplary damages are available for 
actions in negligence are rare and unusual. 
4) CASE LAW IN CANADA 
A) Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club 
The Canadian jurisdiction has made it clear since the early 80s that exemplary damages are 
indeed available for actions in negligence. The case of Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey 
57 Mayne & McGregor on Damages 12th ed. (1961) .. 
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Club 59 arose when the plaintiff brought an action against the hockey club for failing to 
exercise reasonable care in ensuring the safety, fitness and health of one of their players 
causing him permanent injury and therefore exemplary damages were claimed. This is the 
leading Canadian case in which exemplary damages were awarded in an action for 
negligence. The Court held that exemplary damages "may be granted in all cases where the 
conduct of the defendant has been such as to merit condemnation by the court 
60
" The 
appellate Court went on to describe the conduct as 'blameworthy'. Therefore it established 
that intent was not an essential element in awarding exemplary damages. However as with 
O'Bryan J in Coloca61 , the appellate court held that "awards of exemplary damages in 
negligence are rare because in most cases the conduct of the defendants, apart from lack of 
care, has not been blameworthy.62 " However an area of controversy in this case was the 
substantial sum of $35000 awarded for exemplary damages which seemed to be a 
composite of both aggravated and exemplary damages since in justifying the amount, the 
court stressed that pride and dignity had been injured and there had been a loss of 
reputation.(both elements of aggravated damages).63 
B) Subsequent Case Law 
The case paved the way for claims of exemplary damages based on actions in negligence in 
Canada. Previously, it has been said that for punitive damages to be awarded, advertent 
and exceptional conduct is required. However there may be cases in which there has been 
advertent conduct but the only actionable ground lies in negligence. The case of McDonala 
58 Above n.57, 196. 
59 Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club (1979) 103 DLR (3d) 85. 
60 Above n.59, 251. 
61 See n.50. 
62 See n.59, 250. 
63 It is possible that exemplary damages may theoretically be distinguishable from the other 
heads of damages, but it would seem that in a practical assessment of the quantum of 
damages there is no reference point as to what amount would punish and deter the 
wrongdoer. See Chapter on Policy. 
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v Sebastian64 was one such case where the landlord, for profit motives, did not notify the 
plaintiff (his tenants) that water in the building contained excessive amounts of arsenic. 
The judge did not classify the action as being in either negligence or battery but decided 
that on the facts both grounds were actionable as "such an award is proper where the 
conduct of the wrongdoer is so reprehensible that it warrants repudiation"65 . The judge 
held that on the facts, there had been a "shocking disregard for the plaintiffs health and 
safety"66 and thus allowed an award of exemplary damages. 
CJ Recklessness or Conscious Direction 
An area of contention in the Canadian courts however has been that to justify an award of 
exemplary damages in negligence, the conduct must also "have been consciously been 
directed against the person, reputation or property of the plaintiff.67 " This was the view 
followed by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in C.N.R. Co. v di Domenicantonio 68 
where the majority held that "exemplary damages should not be awarded in negligence 
cases unless in the most extreme circumstances or when the act of the wrongdoer was 
consciously directed against the injured party.69 " That was a case where passengers in a car 
collided with a train at a grade crossing. The Court found that Canadian Railways has 
allowed sight lines to the crossing to be obstructed by trees and bushes and failed to sound 
the whistle as was required by statute and the train had been operated at an excessive 
speed. Canadian railways had been continually aware of the dangers surrounding the 
crossing but had done nothing to correct them. Justice Stevenson in the High Court said 
that because Canadian Railway's failure to provide a proper standard of care was not 
directed at the plaintiff, then no exemplary damages could be awarded. He followed the 
64 MacDonald v Sebastian (1987) 43 DLR (4the) 371. 
65 Above n.63, 372. 
66 Above n.65. 
61 Kaytor v Lion's Driving Range Ltd. (1962) 35 DLR (2d) 426, 430. 
68 C.N.R. Co v di Domenicantonio (1988) 49 DLR (4the) 342. 
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authority of Kay tor v lion's Driving Range Ltd. 70 which stated that "punitive or 
exemplary damages should not be awarded in the negligence cases utiless the act of the 
wrongdoer was consciously directed against the injured party."
71 
This reasoning has since been criticized by various writers and judges. Vlchek v Koshel 72 
is a product liability case. There the plaintiff suffered personal injury caused by a defect in 
a motor cycle. Callaghan J said that there was no proper reason as to why it was necessary 
that the negligence of the wrongdoer be consciously directed against the plaintiff and gave 
the example that "if A in attempting to injure B but injured C instead, C would be 
prohibited from recovering exemplary damages form A since the act was not intentionally 
directed against him/her, the injured person, even though the act by itself would merit 
punishment.73" He went on to state that malice or recklessness that indicated indifference to 
the final consequence would warrant punitive damages. "In other words, intention to cause 
the injury need not be present, it will suffice if there was an intention to do the act which 
eventually caused the injury."74 
D) Comment 
It seems to be that the Canadian courts have been confused by the line between intentional 
torts and negligence. A reluctance to award exemplary damages for negligence has caused 
a development in the "conscious direction" element. Still the Canadian Courts have 
indicated clearly, as with the Australian Courts, that exemplary damages are recoverable 
for actions in negligence. 
(:fJ Above n.68 .. 
10 See n.67. 
71 See n.69, 359 
72 Vlchek v Koshel (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 371. 
73 Above n.72, 375. 
74See n.72, 371. 
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5) STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE REQUIRED 
A) Introduction 
Following the current trend of cases in New Zealand and other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, it would seem most likely that should the appropriate circumstances arise in 
New Zealand, a case for exemplary damages in negligence may be awarded. However an 
important question to be answered in its practical application is exactly what standard of 
negligence is required to warrant an award of negligence. 
A set standard or threshold that should be required is important so as to establish a 
consistent pattern for the courts to follow in awarding damages. Only with a set standard 
as to the wrongdoer' s state of mind or the circumstances surrounding the action, can the 
objectives of exemplary damages be properly achieved. It would serve no deterrence 
purpose if the public were uncertain as to the type of conduct that would result in 
punishment. This is clear in the area of intentional torts whereby the tortfeasor must have 
intentionally committed the act In the area of negligence however, a breach of a duty owed 
is not sufficient to warrant an award of exemplary damages. Case law in other jurisdictions 
where such awards have been made have indicated that something more heinous is 
required, such as a situation where the tortfeasor was reckless to the consequences of his 
actions or if he were grossly negligent As well as that any inconsistencies in the standard 
applied by the courts would make awards of exemplary damages seem arbitrary and unfair. 
There are a variety of standards of conduct which have to be satisfied before exemplary 
damages may be awarded. However the difficulty is that there are no clear distinctions 
between the varying standards. At one extreme is intentional conduct where it is clear that 
the act causing the harm was intended by the wrongdoer. This is an absolute standard and 
exemplary damages have always been available in cases of intentional conduct. At the other 
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extreme is negligence as laid down by Donoghue v Stevenson75 and this would be 
inadvertent conduct which would not justify exemplary damages. In between these two 
extremes however is a quagmire of terms and descriptions such as 'recklessness', 'gross 
negligence' and the 'criminal standard for manslaughter'. 
The standard of negligence required to award exemplary damages is still a source of debate 
in jurisdictions where the law has already firmly established the principle that exemplary 
damages are available for actions in negligence. In this section, I will try and analyze the 
various options in the Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
In New Zealand, because of the lack of case law regarding the actual awards of exemplary 
damages for negligence, the only standards of negligence that have been set are those 
which may be inferred from the judgments that have discussed their availability. 
There has been no actual award of exemplary damages in New Zealand for negligence, 
however it would be fair to assume that the courts would adopt a case by case analysis to 
decide if 'contumelious disregard for the plaintiffs rights had been shown.' This is 
because of the need to focus on the particular facts of the wrongdoer's conduct in each 
case. As well as that, the courts must take into account all policy considerations of 
allowing exemplary damages in the circumstances. 
B) The Standard in Australia 
To conceptualize for New Zealand courts as to what would be an appropriate standard of 
negligence, it is important to look at the other Commonwealth jurisdictions for guidance. 
In Australia, the case most relevant to the issue of the standard of negligence required is 
that of Mida/co v Rabenalt6 • The facts here are similar to Co/,oca77 and McKenzie78• The 
75 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932) A.C. 562. 
76 Midalco v Rabenalt (1988) Australian Torts Reports 80, 208 . 
77 See n.50. 
78 See n.37. 
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plaintiff claimed that whilst in the defendant's employ, he was negligently exposed to 
asbestos. The trial judge in that case assumed the availability of exemplary damages for 
negligence and directed the jury as to what standard of negligence was required. He 
adopted a standard of recklessness which he characterized as being "either a deliberate act 
with knowledge, not caring about the consequences, or deliberate failure to inform 
oneselves, in other words, deliberate ignorance, deliberate blindness."79 
The trial judge's definition however was clarified and restated on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Victoria. It raised the standard of negligence required by the court to that of 
"negligent conduct [involving] a carelessness of consequences which had the additional 
characteristic of behaving in a humiliating manner and in wanton disregard of the plaintiffs 
welfare.80 " The additional requirement of flagrant misconduct would seem to push the 
standard closer to that of a criminal manslaughter standard which would be that of 
intentional misconduct. However the author submits that in taking into account the 
wrongdoer's act of 'behaving in a humiliating manner' would seem to be compensating for 
any injuries to pride or dignity which is the domain of aggravated damages. 
C) The Standard in Canada 
In Canada, the courts have struggled with this problem. As was previously mentioned, 
Canadian courts have utilised two different standards of negligence to decide if exemplary 
damages should be awarded. Cases such as Robitaille81, McDonald 82 and Vlchek83 have 
established the standard of recklessness is to be satisfied before exemplary damages may 
be awarded. In Robitaille84 , exemplary damages were to be granted in cases where the 
79 See n. 76, 461. 
80 Above n.79, 462. 
81 See n.59. 
82 See n.64. 
83 See n.72. 
84 See n.59. 
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conduct of the defendant deserved punishment. Vlchek v Koshel 85 stated the requirement 
as being that "the act must be malicious or reckless to such a degree as to indicate complete 
indifference to the consequences that might flow therefrom, including the welfare and 
safety of others. 86" Therefore the recklessness standard is one where the wrongdoer knew 
or ought to have known that his conduct created an unreasonable risk. 87 
There have been other Canadian cases which have imposed a further condition on the 
wrongdoer's recklessness in that the conduct must "have been consciously directed against 
the person, reputation or property of the plaintiff." This extra condition moves the standard 
required closer to that of an intentional act It requires in essence a relationship between the 
wrongdoer and the victim, and in those circumstances, the recklessness would seem to be 
even more exceptional misconduct. This extra requirement also puts a subjective element 
into analyzing the wrongdoer's intent as opposed to an 'objective fault' theory which 
requires the court or jury to decide as to what the defendant "ought to have known". This 
is how the characteristic differs from the forseeable plaintiff element that is established in 
basic negligence. The additional requirement as laid down by Kaytor88 and affirmed in 
C.N.R. Co. v di Domenicantonio89 was negated by Vlchek 90 later in 1988 which held that 
it was not necessary that the act of the wrongdoer be consciously directed against the 
plaintiff. 
An example demonstrating the difference in standards used in Canada may be as follows. 
Supposing if X were the supervisor in charge of the construction of the platform at Cave 
Creek. If during the construction, X was aware of the inadequacies in the platform but did 
nothing about them, it would be established that X was reckless and exemplary damages 
85 See n.72. 
86 Above n.85, 375. 
87 This is similar to the trial judge's judgement in Caloca. 
88 See n.67. 
89 See n.68. 
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would be awarded under the rule as laid down by Vlchek v Koshel. 91 • However if the 
extra condition as imposed by Kaytor92 was required, then it would be necessary to show 
that X was aware that the group of students from Greymouth Polytech was going to be on 
the platform. This extra requirement requires a further sense of directness or relationship 
between the tortfeasor and the victim. In the same vein, it is difficult to distinguish the 
'directness' requirement in Kaytor93 with that of the appellate judge's standard in 
Midalco94• The additional characteristic of 'behaving in a humiliating manner95' indicates 
an element of directness which requires a tortfeasor' s behaviour to be directed at someone 
in a 'humiliating manner'. 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission in a report on exemplary damages in 199096 
adopted the standard of recklessness or the 'ought to have known' standard. The 
Commission accepted that exemplary damages were ordinarily only available for advertent 
conduct and negligence involved inadvertent conduct. The Commission adopted the 
recklessness standard as opposed to the 'gross negligence' standard because on a matter of 
degree, it was more likely that a gross negligence standard would intrude into the area of 
inadvertent conduct They also decided that a victim did not have to be specifically targeted 
since there was no reason in theory to adopt a standard which was too difficult to satisfy 
and thus "immunize a great deal of advertent wrongdoing from punitive damages"97 • 
90 See n.72 
91 Above n.90. 
92 See n.67. 
93 Above n.92. 
94 See n.76. 
95 Above n.94, 462. 
96 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Exemplary Damages (Ontario,1991). 
97 Above n.96, 69. 
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From the example above and the Law Reform Commission's report, it would simply be an 
irn practicable standard of proof if the victim had to show the wrongdoer's reckless 
misconduct was directed at the victim. 
D) Comment 
Upon review of the cases in Australia and Canada, it would seem that should New Zealand 
allow exemplary damages for actions in negligence, it would be best to adopt the 
'recklessness' approach used in Canada. This is because 
1. The additional characteristic of behaving in a 'humiliating manner and in wanton 
disregard of the plaintiffs' rights in Midalco 98 would be an inconsistent standard to 
apply. The test would not be able to be applied independently as it would require a 
wealth of precedent to determine the precise requirements of the test. 
2. The standard in Canada is also preferred over the Australian approach because there has 
been greater discussion and more cases have been decided in the Canadian jurisdiction. 
3. The 'recklessness' approach has received majority support by the courts in Canada 
over the conscious direction requirement in Kaytor9• 
There is no practical reason to the adopt additional characteristic of a 'conscious direction' 
and there would seem to be no distinction between that and the 'reasonably forseeable 
plaintiff' requirement in establishing a duty of care. 
In addition to the recklessness standard, I would also recommend that a factor of the 
degree of risk be added. This is in following with the American Restatement of Torts100 
which defined conduct as reckless and suitable for exemplary damages if: 
98 See n.76. 
99 See n.67. 
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1. It created a strong probability of harm and 
2. the actor knows or has reason to know of this risk. 
This would set a more appropriate standard of conduct consistent with the objectives of 
exemplary damages. Therefore a person would refrain from conduct which he was aware 
would pose a real or considerable risk to another. 
6) POLICY ISSUES 
Whilst case law in New Zealand and other common law countries has indicated a 
willingness to extend the role of exemplary damages to actions in negligence, it is 
important to consider the policy implications of allowing exemplary damages any wider 
application. 
A) Accident Compensation Scheme 
New Zealand's legal environment is unique because of the Accident Rehabilitation, 
Compensation and Insurance Act 1992(ARCIA)
101 .Justice Cooke in Donselaar v 
Donselaar1°2 stated as one of his reasons for allowing exemplary damages in New Zealand 
was that ARCIA legislation served no punitive purpose and it was therefore important that 
'the courts [were] left free to recognize and develop exemplary damages as an independent 
remedy103 .' He also stressed that '[t]he only feasible way of doing so, without intrudini: 
into the field of compensation which the Act has taken over, appears to be to allow cases 
for damages for purely punitive purposes; and to accept that, as compensatory damages 
(aggravated or otherwise) can no longer be awarded
104
'. Therefore it is important that 
100 Restatement (Second) of Torts 500, (1965). 
101 See n.4. 
102 See n.15. 
103 Above n.102, 107. 
04 Above n.103 .. 
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exemplary damages, if awarded, would only serve a punitive purpose and not 'intrude' 
into the field ARCIA105 and serve a compensatory purpose as well. This intrusion would 
undermine the integrity of the scheme and could also be seen as the courts overriding 
Parliament It is important that the ARCIA
106 scheme maintain its integrity and the courts 
should not be seen as to top up any compensation made by the scheme through exemplary 
damages. 
B) Jury Direction 
It is simpler in theory to draw a line between damages that serve a punitive purpose and 
damages that serve a compensatory purpose. However should it be decided that exemplary 
damages may be awarded in actions for negligence, a procedural policy issue of jury 
direction arises. How would a judge direct a jury upon the application of awarding 
exemplary damages? In the case of Auckland City Council v Blunder1°
7
, Justice Cooke 
delivered a model jury direction: 
"Exemplary damages may be awarded if a jury is satisfied on the evidence that 
the oficer acted in bad faith, deliberately using more force than he had to, or 
high-handedly or contemptuously, that would be an abuse of his public 
position. 1~" 
In the area of intentional torts, it is easier for a jury to determine an award of exemplary 
damages since there is evidence of the wrongdoer's intention or maliciousness. Whereas in 
a case of negligence, the jury would have to infer from the facts that the wrongdoer had 
acted in bad faith. As well as that, if a test for the standard of negligence to be breached has 
105 See n.100. 
106 Above n.105. 
101 Auckland City Council v Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732. 
108 Above n.107, 739. 
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not been established accurately then it is likely that a jury could err in deciding the 
availability of exemplary damages. Therefore instead off ocusing on the wrongdoer's 
conduct, the jury may instead look at the victim's inadequate compensation provided by the 
scheme. The Canadian court in Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club 109 failed to 
distinguish clearly between aggravated and exemplary damages in awarding damages. 110 
CJ Double Jeopardy 
Another policy issue to be considered is that of double jeopardy. The situation of double 
jeopardy arises when the wrongdoer has already been criminally punished or tried for the 
same activity in which the victim is bringing a civil claim for exemplary damages. In New 
Zealand, Parliament has legislated both in the Crimes Act 1961 111 and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990112 that where a person has been tried or convicted of an offence, 
s/he shall not be tried or convicted for it again. This issue has recently been subject to the 
scrutiny of the courts. Earlier this year, Master Thompson in Akavi v Taylor-Prestonu 3 
held that 'there may be good policy reasons for refusing to rule out an exemplary damages 
claim merely because there has been a prior criminal punishment for the same activity.' 
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the case was a strike out application and Master 
Thompson placed great importance on Justice Blanchard's reasoning in G v S. 114 It was a 
case of sexual abuse in the Centrepoint controversy where the victim had brought a civil 
claim for exemplary damages but the wrongdoer had already been punished for some of 
the incidents of abuse by the criminal courts. Justice Blanchard concluded that for policy 
reasons, a victim of abuse should have the opportunity to recover exemplary damages in 
109 See n.59. 
110 Refer to pg., 15. 
111 Crimes Act 1961. 
112 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
113 See n.18 . 
114 G v S Unreported, 22 June 1994, High Court Auckland Registry CP 576/93. 
26 
I 
I 
I 
I 
civil proceedings and that opportunity should not be precluded by the criminal conviction 
of the abuser. 
This issue of double jeopardy in New Zealand would seem to be resolved most recently in 
the appeal of G v S. 115 There a unanimous Full Court of Appeal led by Justice Gault, 
pointed out that Justice Blanchard in the High Court did not make any reference to section 
26(2) of the Bill of Rights Act1
16 or the reparation provisions in the Criminal Justice Act
117
• 
He also pointed out that allowing exemplary damages in a situation of double jeopardy 
would be reading down the provision in the Bill of Rights Act to confine the second 
punishment to that of a disciplinary nature. The court said 'we are not persuaded that we 
should do that, particularly since the criminal court is required to consider reparation in all 
cases.' 118 
Therefore because of these provisions in the Criminal Justice Act1
19 which require courts to 
consider reparations and the unwillingness of the courts to read down section 26(2), it 
would seem unlikely that a claim for exemplary damages would be allowed where there 
has been a prior conviction or hearing. 
D) Interference with the Criminal Law 
Whilst this policy issue of double jeopardy would seem to apply to exemplary damages on 
the whole, it is still likely that it would arise in actions for negligence since where negligent 
conduct has taken place resulting in personal injury, Parliament may have legislated 
provisions for the appropriate standards of conduct to be maintained. The Health and 
Safety in Employment Act120 states the required standard of safety to be maintained in a 
115 S v G [1995] BCL 888. 
116 See n.111. 
111 Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
118 See n.114, 1006. 
119 See n.116. 
120 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. 
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workplace and the Companies Act 1993121 has provisions for the standard of conduct with 
which a director in a company must adhere to. The Crimes Act
122 also has provisions for 
standards of recklessness. There are numerous Acts in New Zealand which have already 
legislated for the appropriate standard of conduct to be maintained. If by allowing 
exemplary damages for actions in negligence, the courts would therefore be imposing 
standards of conduct for criminal punishment Not only would this be contrary to 
Parliamentary sovereignty but tort law would also be seen as interfering with the criminal 
law jurisdiction.123 
A further question may be asked as to why exemplary damages should be available to 
victims of criminal behaviour. It would seem that based on S v G
124 
, 'justice will be 
achieved in nearly all cases, and certainly in enough to justify a rule, if separate civil 
actions for exemplary damages are abolished where the actions complained of amount to 
criminal conduct125 ' Therefore it seems unnecessary for judges in civil actions to punish 
the wrongdoer with damages when the Criminal Justice Act
126 has already called upon the 
sentencing judges to take reparations into account 
E) 'Floodgates' Effect 
It is further submitted that any extension of exemplary damages would most likely have a 
'floodgates' effect'. There is a possibility that the New Zealand courts will be flooded with 
personal injury claims disguised as claims for exemplary damages. This issue has been 
addressed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission
127 and they concluded that there was 
121 Companies Act 1993. 
122 See n.110. 
123 This interference with the criminal law has always been a policy argument against the 
imposition of exemplary damages. 
124 See n.114. 
125 C Hodson "Case and Comment on S v G" NZLJ, August 1995, 244 .. 
126 See n.116. 
127 See n.96. 
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no empirical data which indicated a 'floodgates crisis' in Ontario. However because of the 
mean-spirited approach of the 1992 ARCIA legislation128 , inadequacies in the 
compensation provided may force people to disguise their claims as exemplary damages 
ones in the hope of 'topping up' their compensation. 
F) Abuse of the Settlement Process 
It is also possible that broadening the scope of exemplary damages may cause an abuse of 
the settlement process. 129 "[S]purious claims for exemplary damages may have an 
undesirable effect on the settlement process, by coercing defendants to settle claims, or 
settle claims for higher amounts, than they would have otherwise. 130" The cost and 
complications of the legal process may force wrongdoers, especially large corporations to 
settle claims out of court. This would also have the effect of saving the corporation from 
any possible embarrassment 
G) Claims Driven by Profit Motive 
It is therefore possible that a large proportion of these claims will be driven by the profit 
motive. This was one of the strict restrictions laid down by Lord Devlin in Rookes v 
Barnard131 • It is therefore important to preserve the integrity of exemplary damages so that 
they are made to punish and deter wrongdoer's conduct, not to satisfy a claimant who 
views the availability of such damages in negligence to make a 'fast buck' whether it be 
through the courts or the settlement process. 
128 This is because the 1992 legislation has eliminated lump sum payments as well as reducing 
the availability and quantum of damages. 
129 The case of Akavi v Taylor- Preston Ltd. Was eventually settled out of court. 
130 Above n.125. 
131 See n.6. 
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7) CONCLUSION 
The situation in New Zealand at the moment harks back to that of the early 20th century 
where due to the inadequate compensation provided by the Worker's Compensation Act. 
the Courts extended negligence to award common law damages. Since the 1992 ARCIA 
legislation, there have been many criticisms of the system. The inadequate compensation 
has left a hole by which it has been sought that the Courts should redress through the 
broadening application of exemplary damages. 
"It can be argued that a failure by the courts to develop the scope of the remedy 
of exemplary damages this way would, in the light of the scheme of the 1992 
Act, leave too many glaring wrongs without effective remedy. Thus the common 
law should be permitted to develop so as to ensure the availability to victims of 
adequate civil redress for serious wrong doing, in accordance with the standards 
to be expected of the legal system of any civilized society."132 
Therefore the main purpose for allowing exemplary damages for negligence would be to 
make up for the inadequacies of the ARCIA legislation. 
A) Case Law 
Case law in both New Zealand and other common law jurisdictions have all indicated that 
exemplary damages are indeed available for actions in negligence. Australia through 
Midalco and Coloca have established that Australian courts are willing to award 
exemplary damages where the circumstances justify them. The Canadian jurisdiction has 
since Robitaille in 1979 established their availability. Both jurisdictions have conceded 
however that cases where such damages are awarded for negligence are rare. Whilst it is 
decided that they are available, the jurisdictions have encountered problems as to the 
132 R Harrison Matters of Life and Death, 45 in Akavi v Taylor-Preston Ltd. 1995 NZAR 33, 
39. 
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precise test for the conduct required. This has caused confusion as to the threshold of 
negligent conduct required for an award of exemplary damages. 
B) Policy 
The policy issues involved in broadening the role of exemplary damages are not to be 
neglected. This is because of the Accident Compensation scheme that is prevalent 
throughout the New Zealand legal system. Case law from Australia and Canada are 
therefore only indicative of the general direction of exemplary damages in those countries. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there stand an overwhelming number of policy 
issues which must be argued in order to determine the availability of exemplary damages 
for negligence. The most important of these are that of double jeopardy and the ideal that 
any award of exemplary damages must not be contrary to the scope and purpose of the 
Accident Compensation legislation. 
It is therefore submitted that any broadening of the scope of exemplary damages must be 
taken with care and caution as to the consequences involved. Australian and Canadian case 
law are only persuasive because of the confusion and differences in the test to be applied. 
It would only undermine the purpose of allowing exemplary damages to supplement the 
Accident Compensation scheme if the law could not be applied accurately. 
133 
If there are any inadequacies in the Accident Compensation system, these would best be 
solved by the Parliamentary processes. It is doubtful if the courts would find an adequate 
remedy for these inadequacies by using exemplary damages. 
Therefore in conclusion, exemplary damages should not be extended to include actions in 
negligence unless the policy issues raised in this note are adequately answered. 
133 It would seem therefore that exemplary damages may only be clearly distinguished form 
the other heads of damages in a theoretical sense. 
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